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EVIDENCE
George W. Pugh* and
James R. McClelland**
RELEVANCY
Sentencing Phase of Capital Case-Punishment Accorded Co-
Defendant
State v. Brogdon' presented a tough relevancy problem which, not
surprisingly, seems to have troubled the Louisiana Supreme Court. The
problem was whether, in the sentencing phase of a capital case, the
accused should be able to adduce evidence before the jury that his
severed co-defendant, as the result of a separate trial, received a sentence
of life imprisonment without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension
of sentence? The court, speaking through Justice Dennis, after frankly
recognizing the difficulties of the problem, concluded that the trial court
did not commit error in excluding the evidence. Without drawing a
distinction between a trial of the severed co-defendant and those of
other homicide offenders, the court found that:
There can be little doubt that a comparison of defendant's case
to similar first degree murder cases would provide a meaningful
basis for determining whether the case is one of the relatively
few in which the death penalty is to be imposed or one of the
many in which it is not. Such a comparison also could reveal
to the sentencer other relevant mitigating circumstances not listed
in the statute.2
Further, the court conceded that "[a] detailed comparison of the in-
dividual aspects of a defendant's case with those of similar cases is
certainly relevant to the ultimate goal of our system." Despite the
foregoing recognition of the relevancy of the evidence, the court con-
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1. 457 So. 2d 616 (La. 1984).
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cluded that the Legislature had not sought "a detailed comparative
analysis of the other first degree murder cases and sentences by the
jury in a capital sentence hearing." "The presentation and consideration
of such comparative information to a jury .. .would be excessively
time consuming, and probably confusing and distracting." The court
emphasized that under the mandate of the Legislature, the supreme court
had established supreme court review procedures and that under the
constitution and its Rule of Court, it has "the duty of performing a
detailed comparative proportionality review as a safeguard." 3
With concern, the writers agree that no error was committed by the
trial court in the instant case in refusing to receive the testimony in
question. In the punishment phase of the co-defendant's trial, the jury
in that case had been unable to reach unanimous agreement, and as a
result, the judge in that case, pursuant to statute, had sentenced the
co-defendant to life imprisonment without benefit of parole, probation,
or suspension of sentence. It would have been difficult, if not impossible,
for defendant's jury to ascertain why co-defendant's jury had been unable
to reach agreement. The jury deliberations in that other case are, of
course, cloaked in secrecy.4 The naked testimony that the jury deadlocked
in the sentencing phase of the co-defendant's case would not have been
very helpful. The writers agree that under the circumstances it was more
appropriate for the evidence as to the result of the jury deliberations
in the co-defendant's case to be considered only by the supreme court
in its overall review of defendant's death sentence. On the other hand,
if the decision as to the sentence accorded the co-defendant had been
reached by a plea agreement with the prosecutorial authority, a different
result might well have been appropriate, for under the latter circum-
stances, the agreement as to sentencing would have been reached with
the accord of governmental authority and the reasons therefor could
presumably have been quickly elucidated by authoritative testimony.
Other Crime Evidence- Unsolicited Response by Police Officer
Referring to Inadmissible Other Crime Evidence
In State v. Wingo,5 a capital murder case, the arresting police officer,
on direct examination by the prosecution, was asked whether he had
obtained anything from the accused at the time of the arrest. To this
proper question, the police officer expansively replied, "I obtained a
pair of gloves that he said he always used when he committed a crime
because he did not . . ." at which point defense counsel interposed
an objection and demanded a mistrial. The supreme court upheld the
3. Id.
4. La. R.S. 15:470-471 (1981).
5. 457 So. 2d 1159 (La. 1984).
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trial court's denial of defendant's motion for mistrial. Citing precedent, 6
it held that a police officer is not a "court official" within the meaning
of Code of Criminal Procedure article 770 which provides that the
accused is entitled to a mistrial where "the judge, district attorney, or
a court official" in the presence of the jury refers to inadmissible
evidence of other crimes committed by the accused. It further found
that under the circumstances presented in this case, a mistrial was not
''necessary to assure a fair trial"-the test set forth in Code of Criminal
Procedure article 771.
Another capital murder case involving the same question and reach-
ing the same result was State v. Brogdon. 7 In Brogdon, the prosecution
asked its police officer witness whether the defendant had understood
the Miranda warnings, to which question the officer replied: "He in-
dicated he understood. He told me he had been arrested before and
that he . . -"8 Not surprisingly, at this point defense counsel objected
and demanded a mistrial. The trial court's denial of the defendant's
motion for mistrial was upheld by the supreme court for the reasons
set'forth above in the Wingo case.
Although consistent with prior decisions, Wingo and Brogdon are
very disturbing. The problem is a recurring one, 9 and it would seem
that police officers, as public employees belonging to a cadre of law
enforcement personnel, could be successfully trained and persuaded to
avoid such gratuitous references to very damaging other crime evidence.
The legal system rightly considers such references highly improper and
clearly antithetical to the right of each citizen to be accorded a fair
trial. Contempt is an inappropriate remedy unless the officer was aware
of the impropriety, and the granting of a mistrial is a very harsh, costly
measure. However, in light of the damaging effect on the accused's
rights to a fair trial, perhaps it would be advisable for the Legislature
to amend Code of Criminal Procedure article 770 to include police
officers, along with court officials, as those for whose actions the system
6. State v. Perry, 420 So. 2d 139, 146 (La. 1982).
7. 457 So. 2d 616 (La. 1984).
8. Id. at 624.
9. See, e.g., State v. Nuccio, 454 So. 2d 93 (La. 1984); State v. Perry, 420 So. 2d
139 (La. 1982); State v. Douglas, 389 So. 2d 1263 (La. 1980); State v. Schwartz, 354
So. 2d 1332 (La. 1978), discussed in Pugh & McClelland, The Work of the Louisiana
Appellate Courts for the 1977-1978 Term-Evidence, 39 La. L. Rev. 955, 963 (1979); and
cases collected in Pugh & McClelland, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for
the 1975-1976-Evidence, 37 La. L. Rev. 575, 580 (1977), reprinted in Pugh, Louisiana
Evidence Law 115 (Supp. 1978); Pugh & McClelland, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate
Courts for the 1974-1975 Term-Evidence, 36 La. L. Rev. 651, 657 (1976), reprinted in
Pugh, Louisiana Evidence Law 148 (Supp. 1978); Pugh & McClelland, The Work of the
Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1973-1974 Term-Evidence, 35 La. L. Rev. 525, 527
(1975), reprinted in Pugh, Louisiana Evidence Law IlI (Supp. 1978).
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accepts responsibility and consequently mandates mistrial for such clearly
improper, very prejudicial remarks.
Admissibility of Testimony re Polygraph Test Where Passing Test
Was a Condition of Prosecution's Granting Immunity to Witness
In State v. Hocum,'0 the supreme court demonstrated its continued
strict adherence to the principle laid down in State v. Catanesel''-that
it is "the judicial policy of Louisiana to exclude for any purpose
polygraph evidence in criminal trials.' ' 2 In Hocum, the state presented
a witness who testified that he had been engaged by the defendant to
kidnap the defendant's child with a view to sharing the ransom money
with the defendant. On cross-examination, defense counsel vigorously
attacked the witness's testimony, bringing out that the witness had been
promised immunity by the prosecution in return for his testimony. To
meet this attack, the prosecution called as a witness, a supervisor with
the district attorney's office who, over objection, was permitted to testify
to the terms of the immunity agreement-that it, inter alia, contained
a condition that the witness take and successfully pass a polygraph test.
Relying on prior jurisprudence and the strong policy statement in Ca-
tanese, the court found it reversible error to admit the testimony.
Although it is possible under the circumstances to argue that by
attacking the credibility of the witness because of the immunity grant,
defense counsel "opened the door" to the subsequent contested reha-
bilitation, it is believed that the court was correct in adhering to the
strong policy enunciated in Catanese. There is great danger, as stated
in Catanese, that the jury will give conclusive weight to the results of
polygraph tests. Further, to hold otherwise would unduly discourage
defense counsel from bringing out the fact of the immunity agreement.
WITNESSES
Expert Witnesses- Ultimate Issue
May an expert give an opinion on an ultimate issue in the case?
There has been much discussion in the cases concerning this matter,
and a very helpful analysis of the problem is given in State v. Birdsong'3
concerning the admissibility of expert testimony as to whether the defend-
ant in a criminal case knew the difference between right and wrong at
the time of commission of the crime. In a scholarly opinion, Judge
Price of the Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal concluded that
10. 456 So. 2d 602 (La. 1984).
11. 368 So. 2d 975 (La. 1979).
12. 456 So. 2d at 604.
13. 452 So. 2d 1236 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1984).
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such testimony is admissible, even though it involves an ultimate issue
in the case. The court stated that State v. Wheeler, 4 a leading Louisiana
Supreme Court decision with respect to the admissibility of opinion
testimony, does not require a contrary result. The writers fully agree.
In State v. Rushing, 5 in the context of the sentencing phase of a
capital case relative to the propriety of receiving testimony by witnesses
as to whether in their opinion the crime involved was particularly hei-
nous, the court took the position that lay witnesses may not testify as
to an ultimate issue. In the opinion of the writers, the testimony in
question (as well as other evidence at the hearing as to whether or not,
under the circumstances of the case, the witnesses believed death to be
the appropriate sentence), was properly held to be inadmissible evidence.
As the court recognized, the testimony in question was tantamount to
testimony as to the existence of an aggravating circumstance. On the
other hand, the writers feel this testimony was inadmissible not because
it went to an ultimate issue, but rather because its reception violated
the principle underlying State v. Wheeler, 6 for the risk of prejudice
from receiving the evidence far outweighed any helpfulness to the jury
it might have had. Further, the writers agree with the dissenting justices
that the reception of the evidence was not harmless error, and hence
should have necessitated a new sentencing hearing.
Expert Witnesses-Calling Opponent's Expert as One's Own Witness
In State Department of Transporation and Development v. Stumpf,7
the Louisana Supreme Court held that nothing precludes a landowner
from calling as his own witness an expert appraiser retained, but not
called as a witness, by the expropriating authority. In so holding, the
court did not affect the authority of Louisiana cases 8 determining that
one may not call, as a witness under cross-examination,' 9 an appraiser
retained by an opponent. Further, said the court, "[ajrticles 1425(2) and
1424, limiting the rights of an opposing party to compel disclosure by
another's expert of his opinion or the facts on which his opinion is
based, do not create a privilege against the use of the expert as a witness
at trial by the opposing party." 20 The writers fully agree.
14. 416 So. 2d 78 (La. 1982).
15. 464 So. 2d 268 (La. 1985).
16. See supra note 14.
17. 458 So. 2d 448 (La. 1984).
18. Humble Pipe Line Co. v. Roy Aucoin, Inc., 230 So. 2d 365 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1969); State Department of Highways v. Finkelstein, 340 So. 2d 1040 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1976).
19. La. Code Civ. P. art. 1634.
20. 458 So. 2d at 454, referring to La. Code Civ. P. arts. 1425 and 1424.
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PRIVILEGE
Attorney-Client Privilege-Ambit of Privileged Information
The Louisiana Legislature by statute has provided an exceptionally
broad attorney-client privilege for criminal cases. In sweeping language,
Louisiana Revised Statutes (La. R.S.) 15:47521 makes privileged "any
information" acquired by an attorney in consequence of an attorney-
client relationship. What are the implications of the Louisiana statutory
language where the accused in a criminal case seeks to adduce testimony
from another individual's attorney as to information garnered by that
attorney from sources other than his client, or transactions had by such
attorney with third persons on behalf of his client? An aspect of the
problem was before the court in State v. Rankin.22
The defense in Rankin had sought to adduce testimony from an
attorney who presumably had represented a prosecution witness in plea
bargaining negotiations. The relevancy of the testimony, as recognized
by the supreme court, was to develop a possible bias on behalf of the
witness in favor of the prosecution, by showing that the prosecution
perhaps had leverage over the witness. Contrary to langauge contained
in the earlier case of State v. Franks,23 the court took the position that
although such testimony falls literally within the ambit of the Louisiana
statutory privilege, it should not be held to fall within its scope.2 4 In
so concluding, the court relied heavily upon the reasons advanced by
Professor Wigmore and what it considered to be the inappropriateness
of an attorney-client privilege in this context.
The writers agree that under the facts presented in Rankin the
defendant should have been able, over a claimer of privilege, to adduce
the information in question from the attorney for the prosecution witness.
Further, it is well that the suggestion to the contrary in State v. Franks
is disapproved. However, rather than holding that the matter fell outside
21. La. R.S. 15:475 (1981) provides:
No legal adviser is permitted, whether during or after the termination of his
employment as such, unless with his client's express consent, to disclose any
communication made to him as such legal adviser by or on behalf of his client,
or any advice given by him to his client, or any information that he may have
gotten by reason of his being such legal adviser.
22. 465 So. 2d 679 (La. 1985).
23. 363 So. 2d 518 (La. 1978).
24. For other cases giving a restricted scope to La. R.S. 15:475 (1981), see State v.
Jones, 284 So. 2d 570 (La. 1973), discussed in Pugh & McClelland, The Work of the
Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1973-74 Term-Evidence, 35 La. L. Rev. 541 (1975),
reprinted in Pugh, Louisiana Evidence Law 207 (Supp. 1978); State v. Hayes, 324 So.
2d 421 (La. 1976), discussed in Pugh & McClelland, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate
Courts for the 1975-1976 Term-Evidence, 37 La. L. Rev. 575, 593 (1977), reprinted in
Pugh, Louisiana Evidence Law 206 (Supp. 1978).
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the scope of the privilege, in the writers' opinion it would have been
preferable for the court to have held that, under the facts presented in
the case, the privilege must yield to defendant's right to compulsory
process.2 The Legislature presumably intended a very broad attorney-
client privilege for criminal cases; apparently, it wanted to avoid the
unseemliness of an attorney's revealing, absent the consent of his client,
information gathered during the representation of his client, regardless
of where or from whom the attorney acquired the information. Where,
however, the information in question is non-confidential in character
and important to the defense of a criminally accused, it is surely proper
that any privilege should yield to the accused's right to compulsory
process. 26 A far more difficult question is presented, as the court in
Rankin recognized, where the information sought to be revealed is a
confidential communication between the attorney and the witness.
Husband-Wife Privilege-Confidential Communications
is a confidential written communication between husband and wife
subject to a valid confidential connubial communication privilege? Act
157 of 1916 made "private conversations" between husband and wife
privileged. Four years later in State v. Morgan,27 the Louisiana Supreme
Court took the position that a letter between spouses is not privileged,
for it concluded that a letter is not a "private conversation." Not
surprisingly, this very literal interpretation was criticized.28 Nevertheless,
this language of the 1916 statute was repeated unchanged in the Code
of Criminal Procedure of 192829 and in the Revised Statutes of 1950.30
Whether an interspousal letter should properly be regarded as a
"private conversation" and accorded privileged status was again before
the court this past term. The court in State v. Fuller' followed the
interpretation given the language in question in State v. Morgan. Al-
though noting that the case had been criticized, the court in Fuller
25. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S. Ct. 1105 (1974); Durr v. Cook, 589
F.2d 891 (5th Cir. 1979), discussed in Pugh & McClelland, Developments in the Law,
1979-1980-Evidence, 41 La. L. Rev. 595, 612 (1981); U.S. Const. amend. VI: "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to ... have compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses in his favor . . ."; La. Const. art. I, § 16: "An accused is entitled.
to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him, to compel the attendance of
witnesses, to present a defense, and to testify in his own behalf."
26. See authorities cited supra, note 24.
27. 147 La. 205, 84 So. 589 (1920).
28. See J. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 2339 n. 3, at 669
(McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
29. La. C. Cr. P. art. 461 (1928).
30. La. R.S. 15:461 (1950).
31. 454 So. 2d 119 (La. 1984).
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emphasized that the statutory language in question had been twice reen-
acted. Further, it said that in privilege cases the court should ascertain
whether the conversation in question is within the class of communi-
cations sought to be protected by the Legislature.12 Discussing the factual
context in which the privilege question was presented in the instant case,
the court found the circumstances peculiarly unappealing. The court
stated:
When a husband on trial for the murder of his wife's mother
attempts to place the blame on his wife, prior inconsistent written
assertion s to his wife ought to be admissible to challenge the
credibility of the husband's trial testimony, even if the same
statements arguably might be privileged under some other cir-
cumstances. 3
In the opinion of the writers, the statute should be amended to
make clear that interspousal written communications, as well as oral
communications, are subject to a valid claimer of privilege. It seems to
us that the interpretation given in Morgan to "private conversations"
under the 1916 Act was unduly restrictive, and the spirit of the provision,
even when reenacted, calls for a more liberal interpretation. Although
the contextual facts in Fuller were not appealing, contrary to the sug-
gestion made by the court, it seems to these writers that the letter fell
into a class of communications, i.e., husband-wife confidential revela-
tions, that the Legislature sought to-protect. The fact that there is reason
to believe that the husband may have been prevaricating when he wrote
the letter to his wife, and that thereafter at the trial he attempted to
shift the blame to his wife, should not remove it from the class of
communications to be protected. Judicial inquiry as to in what context
the Legislature would consider a particular communication deserving of
societal protection would tend, it is believed, to make husband-wife
communications the object of undue public inquiry and exposure.
HEARSAY
Confrontation-Unavailability as prerequisite to admissibility of out-
of-court declaration
State v. Orlando,34 a second circuit decision, concerns an extremely
important problem: Under what circumstances do the confrontation
32. See State v. Aucoin, 362 So. 2d 503 (La. 1978) (cited with approval in Fuller,
454 So. 2d at 122), discussed in Pugh & McClelland, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate
Courts for the 1978-1979 Term-Evidence, 40 La. L. Rev. 779, 794 (1980).
33. Fuller, 454 So. 2d at 122.
34. 456 So. 2d 1021 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 460 So. 2d 1043 (La.
1985).
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clauses in the state" and federal 6 constitutions require that, as a pre-
requisite to admissibility of an out-of-court declaration offered by the
prosecution in a criminal case, the prosecution "produce" the declarant
if he is "available" (or at least make a good faith effort to do so)?
Orlando involved the admissibility of a statement made by an alleged
co-conspirator about two weeks prior to a homicide, inquiring about
the victim's habits and expressing a desire to kill him. By the time the
defendant's trial began, the alleged co-conspirator had been convicted
of murder and sentenced to death. His conviction had been affirmed
by the Louisiana Supreme Court, and he was seeking relief in the federal
court system. Over defense counsel's objection, the trial court authorized
the introduction of the alleged co-conspirator's statement, without re-
quiring that the prosecution produce the alleged co-conspirator. Relying
heavily upon very strong language in the United States Supreme Court
decision in Ohio v. Roberts,37 the Louisiana Second Circuit Court of
Appeal held as a prerequisite to admissibility of the alleged co-con-
spirator's statements, the prosecution was obliged to make a good faith
effort to produce the declarant, and that such a good faith effort to
produce had not been shown.18 The Louisiana Supreme Court, one justice
dissenting, denied writs on the ground that the result reached was correct.
The matter is a very important one, having broad significance to
the admissibility of hearsay evidence where the maker of the declaration
offered by the prosecution in a criminal case, although available as a
witness, is not produced by the prosecution. The United States Supreme
Court has recently granted writs39 to review a decision by the United
States Third Circuit Court of Appeals, 40 which, placing like reliance on
the important decision in Ohio v. Roberts, arrived at a result similar
to that reached by the Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal in
State v. Orlando. Presumably the problem will soon be elucidated by
the United States Supreme Court.
Declarations to Show State of Mind
State v. Martin4 is the latest in a long line of rich cases concerning
the admissibility of out-of-court declarations to show "state of mind." 42
35. La. Const. art. I, § 16.
36. U.S. Const. amend. Vi.
37. 448 U.S. 56, 100 S. Ct. 2531 (1980). For a scholarly discussion of the significance
of Ohio v. Roberts, see Lilly, Notes on the Confrontation Clause and Ohio v. Roberts,
36 Fla. L. Rev. 207 (1984).
38. One of the judges on the panel concurred in the judgment for reasons different
from those stated in the majority opinion, and on application for rehearing another judge
concurred in denial of rehearing for the reasons stated in the earlier concurring opinion.
39. 105 S.Ct. 2653 (1985).
40. United States v. Inadi, 748 F.2d 812 (3d Cir. 1984).
41. 458 So. 2d 454 (La. 1984).
42. For discussion of prior cases, see Pugh & McClelland, Developments in the Law,
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In Martin, a homicide case, the defendant admitted shooting his wife
after a heated domestic quarrel, but maintained that he shot her in self-
defense. According to his version, he had taken the murder weapon
from his wife after she had aimed it at him, and had shot her with it
in self-defense after she had pulled another pistol (a .357 magnum) from
her purse. Over a hearsay objection by the defendant, the prosecution
was permitted to adduce testimony from a witness that the deceased
wife had told the witness "that if she would ever try to leave James
[the defendant] that he might kill her." ' 43 In upholding this decision of
the trial court, the supreme court acknowledged that the out-of-court
declaration was not admissible to prove that defendant had acted ag-
gressively towards his wife, that the out-of-court declaration of the wife
was inadmissible to show the conduct of the defendant. Nevertheless,
it held that the wife's declaration was admissible to show her state of
mind, to explain why she carried a .357 magnum.
With deference, the writers agree with the forceful dissenting opinion
authored by Justice Lemmon. As contended by Justice Lemmon, it
appears that the reason for the wife's possession of the .357 magnum
was only peripheral in character and that there was great danger that
the jury might ascribe inadmissible weight to the out-of-court declaration,
i.e., use it as tending to show that he had killed her because she had
tried to leave him. As Justice Lemmon stated:
The problem with such evidence is that it appears to untrained
jurors to prove something which it does not really tend to prove
(defendant's conduct, as opposed to his wife's state of mind)
When marginally relevant evidence has little or no probative
value and has a substantial prejudicial effect, then the evidence
must be excluded. Since the prejudicial effect of the wife's out-
of-court statement (its appearance of proof that defendant killed
without justification) greatly outweighed any slight probative
value (any tendency to prove the wife's fearful state of mind),
the evidence should have been excluded. 4
1982-1983-Evidence, 44 La. L. Rev. 335, 348 (1983); Pugh & McClelland, Developments
in the Law, 1981-1982-Evidence, 43 La. L. Rev. 413, 434 (1982); Pugh & McClelland,
Developments in the Law, 1980-1981 -Evidence, 42 La. L. Rev. 659, 669 (1982); Pugh
& McClelland, Developments in the Law, 1979-1980-Evidence, 41 La. L. Rev. 595, 613
(1981); Pugh & McClelland, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1976-
1977 Term-Evidence, 38 La. L. Rev. 567, 584 (1978); Pugh, The Work of the Appellate
Courts for the 1970-1971 Term-Evidence, 32 La. L. Rev. 344, 353 (1972), reprinted in
Pugh, Louisiana Evidence Law 425 (1974).
43. 458 So. 2d at 460.
44. Id. at 463-64 (footnote omitted).
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It is difficult to refute Justice Lemmon's persuasive pronouncement.
It is important to note that in taking the position that declarations
tending to show the state of mind of the victim are inadmissible to
show the actions of the defendant third person, both majority and
dissenting opinions seem to reject the approach taken by the court in
State v. Tonubbee. 45
45. 420 So. 2d 126 (La. 1982), discussed in Pugh & McClelland, Developments in
the Law, 1982-1983-Evidence, 44 La. L. Rev. 335, 348 (1983). For an interesting case
bearing on the issue, and an exhaustive analysis of the problem, see United States v.
Brown, 490 F.2d 758 (D.C. Cir. 1974).

